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Abstract
In this paper, we consider permutation manipulations by any subset of women
in the Gale-Shapley algorithm. This paper is motivated by the college admissions
process in China. Our results also answer Gusfield and Irving’s open problem
on what can be achieved by permutation manipulations. We present an efficient
algorithm to find a strategy profile such that the induced matching is stable and
Pareto-optimal while the strategy profile itself is inconspicuous. Surprisingly, we
show that such a strategy profile actually forms a Nash equilibrium of the manipu-
lation game. We also show that a strong Nash equilibrium or a super-strong Nash
equilibrium does not always exist in general and it is NP-hard to check the exis-
tence of these equilibria. We consider an alternative notion of strong Nash equi-
libria and super-strong Nash equilibrium. Under such notions, we characterize the
super-strong Nash equilibrium by Pareto-optimal strategy profiles.
In the end, we show that it is NP-complete to find a manipulation that is strictly
better for all members of the coalition. This result demonstrates a sharp contrast
between weakly better-off outcomes and strictly better-off outcomes.
1 Introduction
Stability has been a central concept in economic design, ever since the seminal work by
Gale and Shapley [9]. Over the years, intensive research has been done in the literature
of stable matching. A variety of applications of this problem have also been developed,
ranging from college admissions and school matchings [2, 3, 9] to centralized kidney
exchange programs [4, 33, 34, 25] to hospitals-residents matchings [20, 21, 30] to
recently proposed water right trading [26, 37].
In the standard stable matching model, there is a set of men and a set of women.
Each agent has a preference list over a subset of the opposite sex. A matching between
men and women is stable if no pair of agents prefer to match with each other than their
designated partners. Gale and Shapley [9] put forward an algorithm, aka. the Gale-
Shapley algorithm, that computes a stable matching in O(n2) time. The algorithm
(men-proposing version) proceeds in multiple rounds. At each round, each man pro-
poses to his favorite woman that has not rejected him yet; and each woman keeps her
favorite proposal, if any, and rejects all others. The algorithm iterates until no further
proposal can be made.
The algorithm enjoys many desirable properties. It is well-known that the match-
ing returned by the algorithm is preferred by every man to any other stable matching,
hence called the M-optimal (for men-optimal) matching. It is also known that all sta-
ble matchings form a lattice defined by such a preference relation and the M-optimal
matching is the greatest element in the lattice [22]. Furthermore, men and women
have strictly opposite preferences over two stable matchings: every man prefers stable
matching µ1 to stable matching µ2 if and only if every woman prefers µ2 to µ1. As
a result, the M-optimal matching is the W-pessimal (for women-pessimal) matching
[27]. The smallest element in the lattice, the W-optimal (M-pessimal) matching, can
be obtained by swapping the roles of men and women.
1.1 Motivations
This work is motivated by the college admission process in China, where the stable
matching model is adopted. The admissions process consists of two phases: the ex-
amination phase and the application phase. In the examination phase, all students are
required to take the National College Entrance Examination (NCEE, aka. the National
Higher Education Entrance Examination), which is held nation-wide annually. Mil-
lions of students take the NCEE every year, and the number peaked at 10.5 millions in
the year of 2008. The NCEE contains a series of exams on different subjects. After
the examination, each student receives a total score which is the sum of the scores of
the subjects. The total score uniquely determines an ordering of all students, which is
also the preference ordering adopted by all colleges and universities. In the application
phase, each student who takes the NCEE is required to submit an ordered list of about
4 to 6 intended colleges or universities. In the end, the Ministry of Education settles
the applications using the student-proposing version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
However, a major concern of the Gale-Shapley algorithm is its non-truthfulness.
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While it is known that the algorithm is group strategy-proof1 for all men [7], it is not
truthful for women. In fact, Roth [29] shows that there is no stable matching algorithm
that is strategy-proof for all agents.
Such an undesirable property gives rise to the so-called “manipulation” problem
for the women. In China’s college admissions process, besides the NCEE, some top
universities are also allowed to conduct independent recruitment exams. These univer-
sities promise to the students who perform well in these exams that, when applying to
these universities, a certain amount of extra scores will be added to the their NCEE
total scores. In other words, such independent recruitment exams give the universities
the ability to manipulate the admissions result by changing the ordering of the students.
Starting from 2010, several leagues of such universities emerged, with the two most
influential leagues represented by China’s two major universities, the Tsinghua Univer-
sity (the Tsinghua league) and the Peking University (the Peking league). Each league
contains universities of similar types and tiers. Thus universities of the same league
attract about the same set of students, and they conduct the independent recruitment
programs together [1]. The benefits of such leagues are obvious: (1) the costs of or-
ganizing such exams are greatly reduced since they are shared by the universities; (2)
the students only need to participate in one such exam instead of many. However, such
leagues are widely conjectured to be beneficial to universities inside the leagues when
it comes to the quality of finally admitted students, since they can cooperatively manip-
ulate the admissions result to benefit them all. Besides cooperations, the universities
in the same league are also faced with the problem of competition because they share
a similar set of candidate students. In 2012, two top universities (Fudan University
and Nankai University) quit the Peking league, both claiming that they were not able
to recruit their desired students. Such leagues were urged to dissolve in 2015 by the
Ministry of Education for the belief that it is unfair for universities that are not in any
of the leagues.
1.2 Results
We study the problem where a coalition of women (universities) can manipulate the
Gale-Shapley algorithm. Most existing works consider the general case where women
can report any preference list (potentially incomplete) without ties. In contrast, we fo-
cus on the setting where all women must report a complete list of men, which indicates
that women can only permute their true preferences. This type of manipulation comes
directly from the independent recruitment programs in China, where the universities
can only permute the ordering of the students by adding scores to some of them, but
are not allowed to remove any student from the lists.
We model the coalition manipulation problem as a game among the members of
the coalition (called the manipulation game hereafter). We first show that a coalition
of women could get worse off if they perform their optimal single-agent manipulation
separately (see Example 1 for details). This results confirms that there are conflicts
1Precisely, group strategy-proof means no coalition manipulation can make all men in the coalition
strictly better off, in this context. If considering the case where no man is worse off and at least one man is
strictly better off, the Gale-Shapley algorithm is not group strategy-proof [16].
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between different universities in the same league so that they need to find a way to
manipulate jointly to achieve a better outcome.
We present an efficient algorithm to find a strategy profile such that (1) the in-
duced matching is stable with respect to the true preference, (2) the induced match-
ing is Pareto-optimal among all stable matchings that can be achieved by coalitional
permutation manipulations, and (3) the strategy profile is inconspicuous, where incon-
spicuous manipulations are those in which each woman of the coalition only moves
one man to a higher rank (Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2). Surprisingly, we show that
such a strategy profile actually forms a Nash equilibrium of the manipulation game
(Theorem 4.2). Therefore, the strategy profile found by our algorithm captures both
the cooperation and the competition among the universities in the same league. This
result implies that it is computationally easy to find a “profitable” manipulation that is
weakly better off and Pareto-optimal for all members of the coalition, supporting the
wide conjecture that such leagues of universities can benefit from forming coalitions.
However, we show that a strong Nash equilibrium or a super-strong Nash equilib-
rium does not always exist in general (see Appendix E for details) and it is NP-hard
to determine the existence of these equilibria (Theorem 5.1). In other words, a subset
of universities from the league may have the incentive to form a small coalition and
deviation from the manipulation.
We then consider an alternative notion of strong Nash equilibria and super-strong
Nash equilibrium, in which any deviation must induce a stable matching with respect
to the true preference lists. This assumption is reasonable in practice since the leagues
of universities are loose and with no commitment power, and no university will deviate
to an unstable result and provide further manipulation opportunities. It turns out this
alternative notion captures the existence of strong Nash equilibrium and super-strong
Nash equilibrium of the manipulation game. In fact, under the alternative notion, we
characterize the matchings induced by a super-strong Nash equilibrium: a matching is
induced by a super-strong Nash equilibrium if and only if it is Pareto-optimal (Theo-
rem 5.2).
All these results confirm the belief of theMinistry of Education that such leagues of
universities are unfair for other universities. In the end, we show that it is NP-complete
to find a manipulation that is strictly better off for all members of the coalition (Theo-
rem 6.1). This result demonstrates a sharp contrast between weakly better-off outcomes
and strictly better-off outcomes: if a manipulation is costly so that every manipulator
must be strictly better off to ensure nonnegative payoff, a coalition manipulation is
unlikely to happen due to computational burdens.
Our results also give answers to the open problem raised by Gusfield and Irving
[15] on what can be produced by permutation manipulations (see also [24] and [35] for
more of the problem).
1.3 Related Works
There is a large body of literature that focuses on finding manipulations for women
when fixing men’s preferences in the Gale-Shapley algorithm. Gale and Sotomayor
[10] show that it is possible for all women to strategically truncate their preference
lists so that each of them is matched with their partner in the W-optimal matching, and
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Teo et al. [36] provide a polynomial time algorithm to find the optimal single-agent
truncation manipulation.
Teo et al. [36] study permutation manipulations, where a woman can report any
permutation of her true preference list. Their work is motivated by the primary student
assignment process in Singapore. They give an efficient algorithm to compute the
best manipulation for a single manipulator. Gupta et al. [13] extends the algorithm
from Teo et al. [36] to the so-called P -stable (stable with respect to preferences P )
Nash equilibrium setting. Aziz et al. [6] also study permutation manipulations in a
many-to-one setting, but focus on a single manipulator with quota more than one. Pini
et al. [28] create a stable matching mechanism and show that for a single agent, it is
computationally hard to manipulate the matching result. All the results, except for the
last, do not apply to cases where a coalition of women jointly manipulate.
Recently, Dworczak [8] extends the Gale-Shapley algorithm to the setting where
both men and women can make offers, and provides a characterization of the set of
stable matchings, which states that a matching is stable if and only if it is the outcome
of their algorithm.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a stable matching model with a set of men M and a set of women W ,
where only complete and strict preference lists are allowed2. The preference list of a
man m, denoted by P (m), in a preference profile P , is a strict total order ≻Pm over
the set of women W . Let w1 ≻Pm w2 denote that m prefers w1 to w2 in profile P .
Similarly, the preference list P (w) of a woman w is a strict total order over M . For
simplicity, we sometimes use ≻w to denote the true preference profile when it is clear
from the context.
A matching is a function µ : M ∪W → M ∪W . We write µ(m) = w if a man
m is matched to a woman w. Similarly, µ(w) = m if w is matched to m. For two
matchings µ1 and µ2, if for all w ∈ W , µ1(w) w µ2(w), we say µ1 W µ2. If in a
matching µ, a man m and a woman w are not matched together, yet prefer each other
to their partners in µ, then (m,w) is called a blocking pair. A matching is stable if and
only if it contains no blocking pair.
The Gale-Shapley algorithm is not truthful for women [7]. Given a set of women
manipulators, the algorithm can be thought of as a game (henceforth, the manipulation
game), between them. Let L ⊆ W be the set of manipulators and N = W \ L be the
set of non-manipulators.
Definition 2.1 (Manipulation game). Given a true preference profile P , a manipulation
game is a tuple (L,A), where:
1. L ⊆W is the set of manipulators;
2. A =
∏
i∈LAi is the set of all possible reported preference profiles.
2We consider the case where men also report complete preference lists for simplicity. Our result can be
generalized to the case where men may report incomplete preference lists.
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The outcome of the manipulation game (also called inducedmatching in this paper)
is the matching resulted from the Gale-Shapley algorithm with respect to the reported
preference profiles. A manipulator’s preference in this game is naturally her true pref-
erence in P .
Motivated by the NCEE in China, we focus on the setting where all women must
report a complete list of men, which indicates that women can only permute their true
preferences in the manipulation.
Definition 2.2 (Permutation manipulation). Let O be the set of strict total orders over
M . In permutation manipulations,Ai = O, ∀i ∈ L.
Let P (M) = (P (m) : m ∈ M) be the preference profile of all men. Similarly,
denote the preference profiles for all women, all manipulators and all non-manipulators
by P (W ), P (L) and P (N), respectively. Thus the overall preference profile is P =
(P (M), P (N), P (L)). Denote by S(P (M), P (W )) the set of all stable matchings
under profile (P (M), P (W )). Moreover, let SA(P (M), P (W )) ⊆ S(P (M), P (W ))
be the set of all stable matchings that can be achieved by a coalition manipulation of
L. We sometimes write SA for short when (P (M), P (W )) is clear from the context.
We define Pareto-optimality within the set SA.
Definition 2.3 (Pareto-optimal matching). A matching is Pareto-optimal if it is in SA
and there is no matching in SA where all manipulators are weakly better off and at
least one is strictly better off.
We say a strategy profile P (L) of a manipulation game is Pareto-optimal if its
induced matching is Pareto-optimal. In a manipulation game, the solution concept we
are interested in is the Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.4 (Nash equilibrium). A preference profile P (L) =
⋃
l∈L P (l) of a ma-
nipulation game is a Nash equilibrium if ∀l ∈ L, l cannot get a strictly better partner
with respect to the true preference list by reporting any other preference list.
However, a subset of manipulators may have incentive to form a sub-coalition to
deviate from the manipulation. We also consider the following strong versions of the
Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.5 (StrongNash equilibrium (SNE)& Super-strongNash equilibrium (SSNE)).
A Nash equilibrium is strong, if no subset of manipulators can jointly manipulate to a
matching that is strictly better off for all of them. A Nash equilibrium is super-strong,
if no subset of manipulators can jointly manipulate to a matching that is weakly better
off for all and strictly better off for at least one of them.
Our algorithm is enabled by two special structures, the rotations [14] and the suitor
graph [24].
2.1 Rotations
The concept of rotations is first introduced by Irving [18] when solving the stable room-
mate problem, which is a natural generalization of the stable marriage problem.
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In the Gale-Shapley algorithm, if a woman wi rejects a manmj , then wi must have
a better partner thanmj in the W-pessimal matching. Thus in any stable matching, wi
cannot be matched with any man ranked below mj in wi’s list. As a result, we can
safely remove all impossible partners from each man or woman’s preference list after
each iteration of the algorithm. We call each man or woman’s preference list after the
removal a reduced list, and the set of all reduced lists a reduced table.
Definition 2.6 (Rotation). A rotation is a sequence of men R = (m1,m2, . . . ,mr),
where the first woman in mi+1’s reduced list is the second in mi’s reduced list, ∀1 ≤
i ≤ r, and i+ 1 is taken modulo r.
Note that rotations are known as improvement cycles in some literature and is useful
in converting the M-optimal matching to the W-optimal matching [5, 11, 17].
We also use R = (M,W ,W ′) to represent a rotation, where M is the sequence
of men and W and W ′ are the sequences of the first and the second women in M’s
reduced lists. Since Wi+1 = W ′i by definition of rotations, we write W
r = W ′,
whereWr is the sequenceW with each woman shifted left by one position. We may
sometimes use mi and wi to mean the i-th agent in M and W when the order is
important.
After the termination of the Gale-Shapley algorithm, one can still change thematch-
ing by eliminating rotations. The elimination of a rotationR is to force each womanwi
inW to reject her current proposermi and letmi propose to wi+1. It is clear that after
the elimination, each woman still holds a proposal, i.e. there is still a matching between
men and women. More importantly, it can be shown that the matching is stable with
respect to the true preference. We say a rotation R = (M,W ,Wr) moves mi from
wi to wi+1 and moves wi from mi to mi−1 since after eliminating the rotation, the
corresponding matching matches mi and wi+1. It is shown that each stable matching
corresponds to a set of rotations, and there exists an order of elimination that produces
the matching, which we do not discuss in detail here, but refer readers to [15].
2.2 Suitor Graph
Suitor graph is another important structure for our analysis. It is proposed by Kobayashi
and Matsui [24] when considering the problem that given a preference profile for all
truthful agents P (M) and P (N), is there a profile P (L) for the manipulators such that
the M-optimal matching of the combined preference profile is a certain matching µ?
The detailed definition of suitor graph is as follows:
Definition 2.7 (Suitor graph; Kobayashi and Matsui [24]). Given a matching µ, a
preference profile for all men P (M) and a preference profile for all non-manipulators
P (N), the corresponding suitor graphG(P (M), P (N), µ) is a directed graph (V,E),
which can be constructed using the following steps:
1. V = M ∪W ∪ {s}, where s is a virtual vertex;
2. ∀w ∈ W , add edges (w, µ(w)) and (µ(w), w), and let δ(w) = {m | w ≻m
µ(m)};
3. ∀w ∈ L and for eachm in δ(w), add edges (m,w);
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4. ∀w ∈ N , if δ(w) is nonempty, add the edge (m,w), where m is w’s favorite in
δ(w);
5. ∀w ∈ W , if δ(w) = ∅, add an edge (s, w) to the graph;
Kobayashi and Matsui [24] also give a characterization of the existence of such
profiles and anO(n2) time algorithm that can be found directly from their constructive
proof.
Theorem 2.1 (Kobayashi and Matsui [24]). Given a matching µ, a preference pro-
file with P (M) for all men and P (N) for all non-manipulators, there exists a profile
for the manipulators P (L) such that µ is the M-optimal stable matching for the total
preference profile (P (M), P (N), P (L)), if and only if for every vertex v in the corre-
sponding suitor graphG(P (M), P (N), µ), there exists a directed path from s to v (s is
the virtual vertex in the graph). Moreover, if such a P (L) exists, it can be constructed
in O(n2).
3 Pareto-Optimal Strategy Profiles
We analyze the manipulation problem in the independent recruitment programof China’s
universities. In fact, this is also an open problem raised by Gusfield and Irving [15] on
what can be achieved by permutation manipulations. Formally, we have the following
results in this section.
Theorem 3.1. There exists a polynomial time algorithm (Algorithm 1), such that given
any complete preference profile P and any subset L ⊆ W as manipulators, the algo-
rithm computes a strategy profile P ′(L) such that when L reports P ′(L), the induced
matching µ′ is Pareto-optimal3.
Moreover, our algorithmprovides an algorithmic characterization of Pareto-optimal
optimal matchings.
Theorem 3.2. A matching is Pareto-optimal if and only if it is an induced matching of
a strategy profile found by Algorithm 1.
3.1 Conflicts between Manipulators
Before we develop our algorithms, we first show an example to demonstrate that a
coalition of women could get worse off if they perform their optimal single-agent ma-
nipulation separately.
Example 1. Consider the preference lists in Table 1. {(m1, w4), (m2, w1), (m3, w3), (m4, w2)}
is the M-optimal matching. Suppose the set of manipulators is L = {w1, w2} and con-
sider individual manipulations by w1 and w2.
1. w1 exchangesm1 andm2 and get {(m1, w4), (m2, w3), (m3, w1), (m4, w2)};
3It is weakly better off for all manipulators to follow the strategy P ′(L) rather than P , since µ′ is stable
under P , which is preferred by each manipulator to the W-pessimal matching under P .
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m1 w1 w4 w2 w3
m2 w1 w3 w2 w4
m3 w2 w3 w1 w4
m4 w2 w4 w1 w3
(a) Men’s preference lists.
w1 m3 m2 m1 m4
w2 m1 m4 m3 m2
w3 m2 m3 m1 m4
w4 m4 m1 m3 m2
(b) Women’s preference lists.
Table 1: Example of non-cooperativeness
2. w2 exchangesm3 andm4 and get {(m1, w2), (m2, w1), (m3, w3), (m4, w4)};
In both cases, w1 and w2 can manipulate to get their W-optimal partner and these ma-
nipulations are their optimal single-agent manipulation. However, if they jointly per-
form their optimal single-agent manipulations, the inducedmatching is (m1, w1), (m2, w3), (m3, w2), (m4, w4).
It is surprising that they both get worse off than the matching corresponding to their
true preference lists.
This example shows a sharp contrast between permutation manipulations and gen-
eral manipulations, where removing men from the preference lists is allowed. In gen-
eral manipulations, women can jointly perform their optimal single-agent manipula-
tions to be matched with their W-optimal partner [36, 10].
3.2 The Algorithm
To develop the algorithm, we extensively use two structures, rotations [18] and suitor
graphs [23], introduced in Section 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. We further develop sev-
eral new structures such as maximal rotations and principle sets to derive connections
between suitor graphs and permutation manipulations.
Notice that eliminating more rotations results in weakly better matchings for all
women. Thus, the manipulators’ objective is to eliminate as many rotations as possible
by permuting their preference lists. Since there is no direct rotation elimination in the
Gale-Shapley algorithm, we try to figure out what kind of rotations can be eliminated,
i.e., after eliminating these rotations, the corresponding matching is in SA.
We first analyze the structure of the set of rotations. Rotations are not always
exposed in a reduced table. Some rotations become exposed only after other rotations
are eliminated. Thus, we define the precedence relation between rotations and based on
that, we introduce several new concepts, closed set, maximal rotations, and principle
sets.
Definition 3.1 (Precedence). A rotation R1 = (M1,W1,Wr1 ) is said to explicitly
precede anotherR2 = (M2,W2,Wr2 ) if R1 andR2 share a common manm such that
R1 moves m from some woman to w and R2 moves m from w to some other woman.
Let the relation precede be the transitive closure of the explicit precedence relation,
denoted by ≺. Also, R1 ∼ R2 if neither R1 ≺ R2 nor R2 ≺ R1.
Definition 3.2 (Closed set). A set of rotations R is closed if for each R ∈ R, any
rotation R′ with R′ ≺ R is also in R. A closed set C is minimal in a family of closed
8
sets C , if there is no other closed set in C that is a subset of C. Moreover, define
CloSet(R) to be the minimal closed set that containsR.
Definition 3.3 (Maximal rotation & Principle set). Given a closed set of rotations R,
R is called a maximal rotation of R if no rotation R′ ∈ R satisfies R ≺ R′. Let
Max(R) denote the set of all the maximal rotations in R. Furthermore,R is called a
principle set ifMax(R) contains only one rotation.
Henceforth, R1 precedes R2 if R2 can only be exposed after R1 is eliminated. A
rotation R can only be exposed after all rotations preceding R are eliminated. Thus
only closed sets can be validly eliminated. Also, a closed set of rotationsR is uniquely
determined byMax(R). Therefore, given a closed setR, the corresponding matching
after eliminating rotations inR is determined byMax(R).
The following theorem shows that closed sets of rotations are all that we need to
consider.
Theorem 3.3 (Irving and Leather [19]). Let S be the set of all stable matchings for
a given preference profile, there is a one-to-one correspondence between S and the
family of all closed sets.
Therefore, we need to understand the changes made to the suitor graph when a
rotation R is eliminated. We keep track of every proposal made by men in R and
modify the graph accordingly. We first assume that the virtual vertex s is comparable
with each man and for every w ∈ W and everym ∈M ,m ≻w s. When eliminating a
rotation, we follow the steps below to modify the graph:
1. Let all women in R reject their current partner, i.e., delete the edge (wi,mi)
involved in R for each i;
2. Arbitrarily choose a man mi in R and let him propose to the next woman w in
his preference list:
(a) If w is a manipulator, add an edge from mi to w and delete edge (s, w) if
it exists;
(b) If w is not a manipulator, then comparemi with the two men (one is possi-
bly s) in V ′ = {v | (v, w) ∈ E}. Ifmi is not the worst choice, add an edge
frommi to w and delete the worst edge, and we say w is overtaken bymi;
(c) If w acceptsmi, add an edge from w tomi;
3. Repeat step 2 until all men in R are accepted.
Let G and G′ be the suitor graphs corresponding to the reduced tables before and
after the elimination of R. It is easy to check that after modifying G using the steps
defined above, the resulting suitor graph is exactly G′. From Theorem 2.1, the most
important property of the suitor graph is the existence of a path from s to any other
vertex. Therefore, we focus on the change of strongly connected components and their
connectivity in the suitor graph before and after the elimination of rotations.
Definition 3.4. A sub-graphG′ is said to be strongly connected if for any two vertices
u, v in G′, there exists a path from u to v in G′. A strongly connected component is a
maximal strongly connected sub-graph.
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The following lemma gives some connectivity properties of the suitor graph after
eliminating a rotation.
Lemma 3.1. After eliminating a rotation R,
1. all agents in R are in the same strongly connected component;
2. vertices that are formerly reachable from a vertex in R remain reachable from
R;
3. vertices that are overtaken during the elimination of R are reachable from R.
With Lemma 3.1, we do not need to worry about vertices that are reachable from
vertices in R, for they will remain reachable after the elimination. Also, vertices that
are overtaken and the other vertices reachable from overtaken vertices can be reached
from vertices in R after the elimination.
In fact, every vertex is reachable from s in the initial suitor graph. Therefore, if a
vertex becomes unreachable from s after eliminating a rotation, there must exist some
edge that is deleted during the elimination, which only happens when some woman is
overtaken. The next lemma extends Lemma 3.1 to a closed set of rotations.
Lemma 3.2. After eliminating a closed set of rotations R, each v in R is reachable
from at least one vertex in Max(R), i.e., there exists a path to v from a vertex in
Max(R).
This lemma is a generalization of Lemma 3.1. If R2 explicitly precedes R1, then
they must contain a common man. Therefore, after eliminating R1, vertices in R1 can
reach any vertex that is previously reachable fromR2. The analysis goes on recursively
until some rotation has no predecessors.
Given a closed set of rotations R, we say R can be eliminated for simplicity, if
the corresponding matching after eliminating rotations in R is in SA. The following
lemma provides us a simpler way to check whether a closed set of rotations can be
eliminated.
Lemma 3.3. A closed set of rotations R can be eliminated if and only if after elimi-
natingR, every vertex inMax(R) can be reached from s.
However, we still cannot afford to enumerate all possible closed set of rotations,
whose number is exponential with respect to the number of women.
Theorem 3.4. Given a closed set of rotations R, if R can be eliminated, then there
exists a rotation R ∈ R such that CloSet(R) can be eliminated.
The above theorem reduces the search space from the set of closed sets to the set
of principles sets. We are ready to design Algorithm 1 to compute a Pareto-optimal
strategy profile. For any iteration of Algorithm 1, the matching at the beginning of each
iteration is in SA. Therefore, according to Theorem 3.4, if a closed set of rotations R
can be eliminated, we can always find a principle set P∗ contained in R such that P∗
can be eliminated. Since the number of principle sets equals to the number of rotations,
which is polynomial and can be efficiently computed [14], given a matching in SA, we
figure out an efficient way to find a weakly better matching in SA. Using this method
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as a sub-routine, we are able to design an algorithm to find a Pareto-optimal strategy
profile for permutation manipulations.
Algorithm 1: Find a Pareto-optimal strategy profile
Find the set of all rotationsR and all principle sets
P = {CloSet(R) | R ∈ R};
while True do
Construct C = {P ∈ P | P can be eliminated};
if C = ∅ then
Construct P (L) for L and return;
else
Arbitrarily choose a principle set P∗ ∈ C and eliminate P∗;
Notice that at each iteration, the algorithm has multiple principle sets to select
from. To prove our characterization result in Theorem 3.2, we show that for each
Pareto-optimal matching µ, there exists a way to select the principle sets to eliminate
in each iteration such that the induced matching from the output of Algorithm 1 is µ.
4 Inconspicuousness and Incentive Property
In fact, if a stable matching with respect to the true preference lists can be obtained
by permutation manipulations, the manipulators can also obtain this matching by an
inconspicuous manipulation.
Definition 4.1 (Inconspicuous Strategy Profile). A strategy profile is inconspicuous if
each manipulator permutes their preference lists by moving only one man to a higher
rank.
Theorem 4.1. For any stable matching with respect to the true preference lists that
can be obtained by permutation manipulations, there exists a preference profile for the
manipulators, in which each manipulator only needs to move at most one man to some
higher ranking, that yields the same matching.
For convenience,we introduce a new notationPro(w) for eachw ∈ W . A proposal
list Pro(w) of a woman is a list of all men who have proposed to her in the Gale-
Shapley algorithm, and the orderings of its entries are the same as her stated preference
list. A reduced proposal list contains the top two entries (first entry if only one entry
exists) of Pro(w), denoted by Pror(w). Clearly, each womanw is matched to the first
man of Pror(w). Theorem 4.1 suggests that for each woman w, letm1 andm2 be the
two men in Pror(w)
4, then w can modify her true preference list by moving m2 to
the place right after m1 to generate the same induced matching (see Algorithm 2 for
4If woman w only receives one proposal, she cannot implement any manipulation.
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details).
Algorithm 2: Find a Pareto-optimal and inconspicuous preference profile
Use Algorithm 1 to compute a strategy profile P ′(L) for L;
Compute Pror(w) for each w ∈ L with respect to P ′(L);
for w in L do
Modify the true preference list P (w) by moving the second man in Pror(w)
to the position right after the first man in Pror(w);
return the modified preference profile P ;
Although we only have been focusing on constructing Pareto-optimal strategy pro-
files, a Pareto-optimal strategy profile, which is also inconspicuous, actually forms a
Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4.2. A strategy profile, that is Pareto-optimal and inconspicuous, forms a
Nash equilibrium.
Since all Pareto-optimal strategy profiles can be turned into an inconspicuous one
by Algorithm 2, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.1. All Pareto-optimal matchings can be induced by a Nash equilibrium.
Therefore, Pareto-optimal matchings exactly address both the cooperation and the
competition among the women in the coalition.
5 Strong and Super-Strong Nash Equilibrium
In the college admissions process in China, it is possible that some universities may quit
the league and form a new one. Therefore it is necessary that we consider the solution
concepts of strong and super-strong Nash equilibria. However, a Nash equilibrium
does not necessarily form a strong or super-strong Nash equilibrium (see Appendix E
for details). Moreover, it is NP-hard to check the existence of a strong or super-strong
Nash equilibrium, and thus, it is even harder to compute a strong or super-strong Nash
equilibrium.
Theorem 5.1. It is NP-hard to check whether there exists a strong or super-strong
Nash equilibrium.
5.1 Feasibility Condition
The concepts of strong and super-strong Nash equilibria are sometimes criticized to
be too strong in that they do not exist in many games. We consider the following
feasibility condition of a deviation [32, 31, 10]:
Condition 5.1 (Feasibility). Any feasible deviation must induce a stable matching with
respect to the true preference lists.
We refine the super-strong Nash equilibrium with the feasibility condition as fol-
lows.
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Definition 5.1 (Super-strong Nash equilibrium (SSNE) with the feasibility condition).
A Nash equilibrium is super-strong, if no subset of manipulators can jointly manipulate
to a matching that is weakly better off for all and strictly better off for at least one of
them by a feasible deviation.
Condition 5.1 weakens the definitions of super-strong Nash equilibrium because it
restricts possible deviations of agents to those that induce stable matchings with respect
to the true preferences. Condition 5.1 is well-motivated and standard from the stable
matching literature. As Roth [31] and Roth and Vande Vate [32] suggest, stability
is of great importance for a successful clearinghouse. Empirical evidence shows that
most stable mechanisms have succeeded in practice while almost all unstable ones have
failed. If the induced matchings were unstable, a manipulation is no longer a Nash
equilibrium, thus agents are unlikely to follow and the manipulations fall apart [10].
Such unpredictability makes the unstable matchings less desirable to the manipulators.
Back to the motivation from NCEE, this condition is reasonable in practice since the
leagues of universities are loose and with no commitment power, and no university will
deviate to an unstable result and provide further manipulation opportunities. Therefore,
a further deviation to an unstable matching is hard to form and maintain.
With Condition 5.1, we are able to use Pareto-optimal matchings to characterize
the set of matchings induced by super-strong Nash equilibria.
Theorem 5.2. A matching is Pareto-optimal if and only if it is induced by a super-
strong Nash equilibrium.
6 Strictly Better-off Outcomes
The above results show that the Gale-Shapley algorithm is vulnerable to coalition ma-
nipulation. However, if a manipulation is costly such that every manipulator needs to
be strictly better off after the manipulation to preserve individual rationality, we show
a hardness result:
Theorem 6.1. Even with the feasibility condition, it is NP-complete to find a strategy
profile, the induced matching of which is strictly better off for all manipulators.
Therefore, when the manipulation is costly, a manipulation coalition is unlikely to
form and the Gale-Shapley algorithm is immune to coalition manipulations. According
to Theorem 6.1, one immediate corollary is that the number of Pareto-optimal match-
ings cannot be polynomial in the number of men and women. For otherwise, we can
enumerate all such matchings by Algorithm 1 to develop a polynomial time algorithm.
Last but not least, we show that the problem to compute the number of Pareto-optimal
matchings, which are strictly better off for all manipulators, is #P-complete.
Theorem 6.2. It is #P-complete to compute the number of Pareto-optimal matchings,
which are strictly better off for all manipulators.
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APPENDIX
A Omitted Proofs in Section 3
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
The proof of Lemma 3.1 is based on the following lemma.
Lemma A.1. For each man mi in R, in the procedure of eliminating the rotation R,
wi+1 (the subscript is taken modulo r) is the first woman to accept him, and each
woman in R accepts only one proposal during the procedure.
Proof. According to the definition of rotations,wi+1 is the second inmi’s reduced list.
If there are other women between wi and wi+1 inmi’s preference list, they are absent
from the reduced list because these women already hold proposals from better men.
Henceforth, even though mi proposes to these women, they reject him. But mi is in
wi+1’s reduced list since wi+1 is inmi’s. Therefore,mi is a better choice for wi+1 and
wi+1 accepts him.
After the elimination, each manmi inR proposes towi+1 and eachman is accepted
only once. Also each woman wi+1 holds a new proposal frommi and thus accepts at
least once. The conclusion is immediate since the total number of each man being
accepted equals to the total number of each woman accepting a new partner.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. For each mi in R, R moves mi from wi to wi+1. As a result,
there exists an edge from wi+1 to mi. We now prove that each mi has an outgoing
edge pointing towi, and all agents inR then form a cycle, and thus in the same strongly
connected component. Before the elimination, wi is the partner of mi, so there is an
edge from mi to wi. If wi is a manipulator, the edge (mi, wi) is not removed during
the elimination according to the steps described above. If wi is not a manipulator, then
only two incoming edges are remained after the elimination and these edges are from
the best two men among those who propose to her. According to Lemma A.1, only one
man, namelymi−1, is accepted. Thus,mi−1 is the best suitor of wi. We claim thatmi
is the second best and the edge frommi is still in the suitor graph. Otherwise, suppose
m′ is a better choice thanmi to wi. Thenm
′ is also in R. We letm′ propose first, and
wi acceptsm
′, which makes wi accepts at least twice. A contradiction.
Since each woman can be reached from her partner before the elimination, it is
without loss of generality to assume that a vertex v can be reached from a manm in R
through a path p. Let u be the last vertex in p such that u is in R or is overtaken by a
vertex in R. If u is in R, then after the elimination,m can reach u since they are in the
same strongly connected component. If u is overtaken by some vertexm′, then during
the elimination, an edge (m′, u) is added to the graph. Thus, m can reach u through
m′. Henceforth, in any case, u is reachable. Since in p the vertices between u and v
are neither in R nor overtaken by some vertex in R, the path from u to v remains in
the modified graph. Therefore v is reachable fromm and also from any vertex in R for
they are in the same strongly connected component after the elimination.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof of Lemma 3.2. We eliminate the rotations in R one by one and generate a se-
quence of rotations q = (R1, R2, . . . , Rn). Ri is the i-th rotation to eliminate, and
after eliminating Rn, all rotations in R are eliminated. Denote qi as the set of the ro-
tations before Ri in q. For each i, qi is a closed set. We call i the sequence number
of qi and we prove by induction on the sequence number that after eliminating qi, all
vertices in qi can be reached from a vertex inMax(qi). For i = 1, qi = {R1}, the case
is trivial from Lemma 3.1. Assume the statement is true for i = k, then for i = k + 1,
we only eliminate one more rotation Rk+1 than in the case with i = k. Rk+1 is in
Max(qk+1) otherwise there exists another rotation R
′ in qk such that Rk+1 ≺ R′ and
then qk is not a closed set. Let D = Max(qk) \Max(qk+1). Rotations in D are no
longer maximal rotations simply because Rk+1 is eliminated, which indicates that ro-
tations inD explicitly precedeRk+1. Henceforth, every rotationR inD has a common
agent with Rk+1 and each vertex u reachable from R is reachable from that common
agent. According to Lemma 3.1, u can be reached from Rk+1. For each vertex u
′ that
is not reachable from rotations in D, it must be reachable from another rotation R′ in
Max(qk) through path p and R
′ is still inMax(qk+1). If p is still in the suitor graph,
then we are done. Otherwise, some vertices in p must be in Rk+1 or is overtaken by
a man in Rk+1. Let z be the last vertex in p such that z is in Rk+1 or is overtaken. z
can be reached from Rk+1 and the path from z to u
′ is not affected by the elimination.
Therefore, u′ is reachable from Rk+1.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Proof of Lemma 3.3. If a closed set of rotationsR can be eliminated, then every vertex
is reachable afterR is eliminated. As a result, any member ofMax(R) is reachable.
If after eliminating R, any member of Max(R) can be reached from s, then we
need to show that all other vertices are also reachable from s. We split all vertices into
two parts. Let V denote the set of all the vertices that can be reached from members of
Max(R). If a vertex v is in V , then v is reachable from s throughMax(R). If v is
not in V , then in the initial graph, there is a path p from s to v. We claim that all the
vertices in path p is not in any of the rotations in R or overtaken when eliminating a
rotation. Otherwise, according to Lemma 3.2, v is reachable fromMax(R). Thus, the
path p is still in the graph after eliminating all the rotations inR.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3.4
In order to prove Theorem 3.4, we first consider the following lemma about the maxi-
mal rotations of a closed set that can be eliminated.
Lemma A.2. If a closed setR can be eliminated, then every rotation inMax(R) must
contain a manipulator.
Proof. Assume on the contrary that there exists a rotation R in Max(R) such that R
contains no manipulators. We can always change the order of elimination to make R
the last to eliminate. We prove that after eliminatingR, any vertex inR is not reachable
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from s. From the proof of Lemma 3.1, we know that all vertices inR form a cycle after
eliminating R. Each man in R has only one incoming edge from his current partner
who is also in R. Each woman has two incoming edges, one from her partner in R and
another from her former partner which is also in R. Thus, every vertex in R has no
incoming edges from outside the cycle and thus is not reachable from s.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Let V be the set of all vertices in R. After eliminating R, we
arbitrarily choose a vertex v in V . In the corresponding suitor graph, there is a path
p = (v0 = s, v1, v2, . . . , vn = v) from s to v since R can be eliminated. Let u be
the first vertex in p such that u is in V . u is obviously not v1, or otherwise the edge
(s, u) will be deleted. Moreover, u must be in L, since any non-manipulator can only
be reached from a node in V if she is overtaken during the elimination. Assume u = vl
and l > 1. Then the sub-path p′ = (v0, v1, . . . , vl = u) is not affected (no vertices in
V or overtaken) during the elimination. Henceforth, p′ is in the original suitor graph
before eliminating R. Now we consider the set R′ = {R ∈ R|u ∈ R}. For any R in
R′, if we eliminateCloSet(R), the sub-path is also not affected. ThereforeCloSet(R)
can be eliminated according to Lemma 3.3.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 3.1
A.5.1 Correctness of Algorithm 1
To prove the correctness of the algorithm. We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma A.3. Given a set of manipulators L ∈ W , and the true preference profile
P = (P (M), P (W )). Let µ be any matching in SA and R be the corresponding
closed set of rotations. Then there exists a preference profile Pµ(L) for L such that µ is
the M-optimal stable matching of the preference profile Pµ = (P (M), P (N), Pµ(L)),
and the reduced table of P after eliminatingR is exactly the reduced table of Pµ before
eliminating any rotation.
Proof. Since µ is in SA, there exists P
′ = (P (M), P (N), P ′(L)) such that the in-
duced matching µ. For each w ∈ L, we modify P ′(w) as follows:
1. delete all menm such thatm ≻Pw µ(w);
2. reinsert them at the beginning according to their order in w’s true preference list;
3. move µ(w) to the position right after all menm such thatm ≻Pw µ(w);
Denote the modified preference profile by P ′µ. In fact, P
′
µ is the Pµ we are looking for.
We first prove that µ is the M-optimal matching under P ′µ. After the first two steps
of modifications, the M-optimal matching is still µ, since for each w, we only change
the position of men ranked higher than µ(w) in her true preference list, who must have
not proposed to w under P ′, and thus do not change the output of the Gale-Shapley
algorithm. Otherwise, if a man m with m ≻Pw µ(w) has proposed to w, then we must
have w ≻P
′
m µ(m), which is equivalent to w ≻
P
m µ(m). Thus (m,w) forms a blocking
pair in µ under the true preference profile P , contradicting to the stability of µ underP .
In the third step, we move µ(w) to the position right after all men ranked higher than
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µ(w) in the true preference list P (w). Consider all the menm′ withm′ ≻P
′
w µ(w) but
µ(w) ≻
P ′µ
w m′. m′ must have not proposed to w under P ′, or otherwise µ(w) cannot
be the partner of w. Therefore, the positions of the men in P ′µ do not affect the output
of the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
Let TPµ be the reduced table of P after eliminatingR and TP ′µ be the reduced tables
of P ′µ. We already know that for each woman, her partners in the two reduced tables
are the same, which is µ(w). In fact, a change of reduced table happens if and only if
a woman accepts a proposal from a man m and removes everyone ranked below m in
her preference list. Henceforth, in the reduced list of each woman, no man is ranked
below her current partner. Therefore, to prove that TPµ is the same as TP ′µ , if suffices
to show that for each woman, P and P ′µ are the same after removing all men ranked
below her current partner, which is clear from the construction of P ′µ.
From Theorem 3.3, we know that only closed sets need to be considered. Although
the Lemma A.2 has already ruled out all closed sets that have a maximal rotation con-
taining only non-manipulators, there are still exponentially many possibilities. How-
ever, Theorem 3.4 shows that every closed set that can be eliminated contains a princi-
ple set, which can also be eliminated. A natural idea is to iteratively grow the closed
set by adding principle sets. The above lemma shows that after each iteration, we can
construct a problem that has the current matching as its initial matching, and contains
rotations that are not yet eliminated. If we find a principle set that can be eliminated in
the constructed problem, it can also be eliminated in the original problem.
A.5.2 Complexity of Algorithm 1
To analyze the time complexity of Algorithm 1, we define a graph describing the prece-
dence relation between rotations.
Definition A.1 (Precedence graph). Given a set of rotations R, let D be a directed
acyclic graph, where the vertices inD are exactlyR, and there is an edge (R1, R2) in
D if R1 ≺ R2. Moreover, letH be the transitive reduction ofD defined above, andHr
be the graphH with all edges reversed.
Note that H is exactly the directed version Hasse diagram of the precedence re-
lation between rotations. For a rotation R, CloSet(R) is the set of vertices that can
be reached from R through a directed path in Hr. We split the algorithm into the
initialization part and iteration part, and assume |M | = |W | = n.
In the initialization part, we first compute the initial matching using the Gale-
Shapley algorithm, which can be computed in O(n2) time. Next we find all rotations
with respect to preference profile P and also find all the principle sets. These two op-
erations depend on the graph Hr. However, the graph H is the transitive reduction of
D, and the construction of H is somewhat complex. Gusfield [14] discusses how to
find all rotations, whose number is O(n2), in O(n2) time. Instead of constructingH ,
Gusfield considered a sub-graph H ′ of D, whose transitive closure is identical to D.
Moreover,H ′ can be constructed in O(n2) time. We will not discuss how to construct
H ′ in detail but only apply Gusfield’s results here. Then for each rotation R, we only
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need to search H ′ to find CloSet(R), which takes O(n2) time. Thus, we finish the
initialization step in O(n4) time since there are O(n2) rotations altogether.
The iteration part is the bottleneck of the algorithm. At least one rotation is elimi-
nated for each iteration, and thusO(n2) iterations are needed. Inside each iteration, we
need to construct the set C . There are O(n2) principle sets and to determine whether
a principle set can be eliminated, we need to simulate the Gale-Shapley algorithm and
modify the suitor graph accordingly. After the modification, we traverse the suitor
graph to see if each vertex is reachable. Both of the two operations takes O(n2) time.
Thus, the construction of C takes O(n4) time. In the If-Else statement, if we find
a principle set that can be eliminated, we eliminate the principle set and modify the
suitor graph in O(n2). Otherwise, we traverse the suitor graph to construct the prefer-
ence profile for L according to Theorem 2.1. Thus, the If-Else statement takes O(n2)
time and totally, the time complexity is O(n6).
A.6 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Assume the P (L) is a Pareto-optimal strategy profile for the
manipulators. Let µ be the matching produced by P (L) and Rµ the corresponding
set of rotations. µ can be forced to be the induced matching by always choosing the
principle set that is a subset ofRµ. LetRk be the rotations eliminated so far at the end
of the k-th iteration and µk be the corresponding matching . We prove by induction on
the iterations that at the end of each iteration,Rk is a subset ofRµ. In the first iteration,
Rµ is in SA, so there exists a principle set P ⊂ Rµ that can be eliminated. Assume the
statement holds for the k-th iteration. At the beginning of the (k+1)-th iteration, µk is
the induced matching, andRk is a subset ofRµ by the inductive hypothesis, then there
exists at least one principle set Pk+1 ⊂ Rµ \ Rk that can be eliminated. Therefore, at
the end of the (k + 1)-th iteration,Rk+1 = Rk ∪ Pk+1 is also a subset of Rµ. When
the algorithm terminates, the set of all eliminated rotations R is also a subset of Rµ.
Assume R 6= Rµ, then we can find some principle set to eliminate, which contradicts
to the termination condition of the algorithm. Therefore the Pareto-optimal strategy
profile can be found by the algorithm.
B Omitted Proofs in Section 4
B.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Lemma B.1. Given all agents’ true preference profile (P (M), P (W )), if a matching
µ is in SA with corresponding preference profile P = (P (M), P (N), P (L)), then the
induced matching is still µ, if for each w ∈ L, we modify w’s preference list by moving
Pror(w) to the top and ordering other men arbitrarily.
Proof. Suppose the corresponding matching to the modified preference profile is µ′.
We show that µ′ = µ.
Let P and P ′ be the original profile and the modified profile. All the partial orders
we used in this proof is defined in P . We construct a graph T , which is a sub-graph
of suitor graph G(P (M), P (N), µ), according to the set of all reduced proposal lists
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in P . The set of vertices is just M ∪W , and the edges are E = {(w, µ(w)) | w ∈
W}∪ {(m,w) | w ≻m µ(m),m ∈ Pror(w)}. We also add a virtual vertex s, and add
edges from s to each woman who has no incoming edges. Note that every woman has
an outgoing edge pointing to her mate in µ, and at most one incoming edge from her
second entry in her proposal list. It is easy to prove that at least one woman has only
one entry in her proposal list, and thus this woman has no incoming edge except the
one from s.
It is straightforward to check that µ is also stable underP ′. Then we have µ′(m) m
µ(m), which indicates that if m proposes to some woman w in P ′, then he also pro-
poses to her in P . Now we can prove the lemma by induction on the height of the
breath-first search tree on graph T rooted at s. Denote the height of a vertex as h(v).
For each vertex with h(v) = 1, it must be a woman and has no incoming edge from
vertices ofM . Therefore, she gets only one proposal from µ(w) in P . Therefore each
manm other than µ(w)must be matched to a better woman, i.e., µ(m) ≻m w. Also, as
proved above µ′(m) m µ(m). Then we have µ′(m) ≻ w, which meansm does not
propose to w in P ′. The only possible partner for w is µ(w). Thus, we can conclude
that she is matched with µ(w) in µ′, or µ′(w) = µ(w).
Assume µ′(v) = µ(v) for each v with h(v) = k, then for a vertex v′ with h(v′) =
k + 1, we prove that we still have µ′(v′) = µ(v′). If k + 1 is even, then v′ is a man
and we consider v′’s parent v = Prt(v′). From the construction of the graph, there is
an edge from v to µ(v). Henceforth, according to the inductive hypothesis, µ′(v) =
µ(v) = v′, and µ(v′) = v = µ′(µ′(v)) = µ′(v′). If k + 1 is odd, then v′ is a woman
and there is an edge pointing to her from v who is the second entry in her received
proposal list. On the one hand, each man in {m|m ≻v µ(v)} is matched with someone
who is better than v in µ. As a result, µ(m) ≻m v. And still µ′(m) m µ(m), we
have µ′(m) ≻ v. Thereforem does not propose to her in P ′. On the other hand, µ(v)
proposes to v in P ′ since µ(v) proposes to her in P . Combining the two sides, we know
that µ(v) is the best man among all those who propose to her. Thus, µ′(v) = µ(v).
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We first construct the suitor graph using µ and compute the cor-
responding P (L) according to Theorem 2.1. After that, we can compute Pro(w) and
Pror(w) for each woman w according to P (L). Then we just move the second entry
(if exists) of Pror(w) to the position right after µ(w) in each manipulator w’s original
preference list. Notice that in the modified preference list, no man who is ranked higher
than µ(w) in w’s preference list proposes to w, or otherwise the induced matching is
unstable with respect to true preference lists. Thus, the orderings of these men is irrel-
evant to the matching result and we can move Pror(w) to the top without affecting the
induced matching µ′ for the modified lists. According to Lemma B.1, we can conclude
that µ′ = µ.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2
In order to prove Theorem 4.2, we show the following lemmas first.
Lemma B.2. Suppose there is only one manipulatorw. Then the best matching µ′ that
w can obtain via permutation manipulation is stable with respect to the true preference
P .
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Proof. Let P ′ be the preference profile corresponding to µ′. Assume on the contrary
that µ′ is not stable with respect to P . Then there must be a blocking pair. However,
any pair (m,w′) with w′ 6= w cannot block µ′ under P , since they have the same
preferences in both P and P ′. It follows that the woman in the blocking pair must be
w. Let (m,w) be the blocking pair. We move m to the top of P ′(w). If we run the
Gale-Shapley algorithm with the new preference profile,m will still propose to w and
will finally be matched to w sincem is now the favorite man of w. But m ≻w µ′(w),
which contradicts to the fact that µ′ is the best matching that w can obtain.
Our proof also relates to the following theorem from Gonczarowski and Friedgut
[12].
TheoremB.1 (Gonczarowski and Friedgut [12]). Given agents’ strict preferences over
agents of the other sex, and a set of manipulators L ∈ W are allowed to use general
manipulations, if no lying woman is worse off, then (1) No woman is worse off; (2) No
man is better off.
Since our setting is a special case of theirs, the above theorem applies to our setting.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Denote by P and µ the true preference profile of agents and
the corresponding matching. Let P1 be the preference profile returned by Algorithm 2
given P , and µ1 be the corresponding matching. It is clear that for each w ∈ L,
Algorithm 2 only changes the order of the men ranked strictly lower than µ1(w). For
the sake of contradiction, assume there exists a manipulator w′ ∈ L such that w′ can
get a strictly better partnerm (m ≻Pw′ µ1(w
′)) by misreporting a different preference
list. Let P2 and µ2 be the preference profile after misreporting and the corresponding
matching. Without loss of generality, we assume that m is the best partner (according
to both P and P1) that w
′ can obtain. Then we know from Lemma B.2 that, µ2 is
stable with respect to P1. According to Theorem B.1, for each w ∈ W , we have that
µ2(w) P1w µ1(w). It follows that µ2(w) 
P
w µ1(w), since Algorithm 2 does not
change the order of the men who are ranked higher than µ1(w). It follows that µ2 is
also stable with respect to P , and µ2 Pareto-dominates µ1. However, µ2 is not found
by Algorithm 2. A contradiction.
C Omitted Proofs in Section 5
C.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Again, we prove the NP-hardness via a reduction from 3-SAT to our problem. We
reuse the constructionG(φ) in Appendix 6.1 with the several modifications to construct
G′(φ). First, we add 5m men, {mbcj | ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m, 1 ≤ b ≤ 5} and 5m women
{wbcj | ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m, 1 ≤ b ≤ 5} to the graph. For each cj , the preference lists of newly
20
added men are
P (m1cj ) = w
1
cj
≻ w5cj ≻ w
2
cj
≻ w3cj ≻ w
4
cj
≻ · · ·
P (m2cj ) = w
1
cj
≻ w2cj ≻ w
3
cj
≻ w5cj ≻ w
4
cj
≻ · · ·
P (m3cj ) = w
3
cj
≻ w1cj ≻ w
2
cj
≻ w4cj ≻ w
5
cj
≻ · · ·
P (m4cj ) = w
3
cj
≻ w4cj ≻ w
1
cj
≻ w2cj ≻ w
5
cj
≻ · · ·
P (m5cj ) = w
5
cj
≻ w1cj ≻ w
4
cj
≻ w2cj ≻ w
3
cj
≻ · · ·
and of newly added women are
P (w1cj ) = m
3
cj
≻ m5cj ≻ m
l
cj
≻ m1cj ≻ m
2
cj
≻ m4cj ≻ · · ·
P (w2cj ) = m
5
cj
≻ m3cj ≻ m
l
cj
≻ m1cj ≻ m
2
cj
≻ m4cj ≻ · · ·
P (w3cj ) = m
1
cj
≻ m3cj ≻ m
4
cj
≻ m2cj ≻ m
5
cj
≻ · · ·
P (w4cj ) = m
4
cj
≻ m1cj ≻ m
2
cj
≻ m3cj ≻ m
5
cj
≻ · · ·
P (w5cj ) = m
2
cj
≻ m5cj ≻ m
1
cj
≻ m3cj ≻ m
4
cj
≻ · · ·
Notice that, the above preference lists are derived from the example in Section E. For
each cj , we change the preference lists ofm
l
cj
to
P (mlcj) = w
l
cj
≻ w1cj ≻ w
2
cj
≻ wrcj ≻ · · ·
Finally, we change the set of manipulators to {w+2xi | ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {w
−2
xi
| ∀1 ≤ i ≤
n} ∪ {w1cj , w
3
cj
| ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m}.
Lemma C.1. In a Nash equilibrium ofG′(φ), ifmlcj is rejected by w
l
cj
, thenmlcj must
be matched with wrcj and for all 1 ≤ b ≤ 5, w
b
cj
is matched with her favorite man.
Proof. Note that aftermlcj gets rejected by w
l
cj
, he will begin to make proposal to w1cj .
One can simulate the Gale-Shapley algorithm and verify that if w1cj and w
3
cj
do not
manipulate, thenmlcj must be matched with w
r
cj
and for all 1 ≤ b ≤ 5, wbcj is matched
with her favorite man. Therefore, conditioned on the fact thatmlcj gets rejected byw
l
cj
,
such matching is the unique stable matching betweenmbcj andw
b
cj
for 1 ≤ b ≤ 5, since
M -optimal matching is the same as theW -optimal matching. Moreover, since a Nash
equilibrium of G′(φ) must induce a stable matching with respect to true preferences,
we finish the proof.
Note that, Lemma D.1, Lemma D.2 and Lemma D.3 still holds after modifications.
Lemma D.5 is also true due to Lemma C.1. Now we are ready to complete our reduc-
tion by showing φ is satisfiable if and only if G′(φ) has a strong or super-strong Nash
equilibrium.
Lemma C.2. φ is satisfiable only if there exists a strong or super-strong Nash equilib-
rium in G′(φ).
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Proof. Suppose (l′1, . . . , l
′
n) is a satisfiable assignment. For all i ∈ [n],
1. if l′i = +xi: w
+2
xi
manipulates tom−3xi and w
−2
xi
manipulates tom−1xi ;
2. if l′i = −xi: w
+2
xi
manipulates tom+1xi and w
−2
xi
manipulates tom+3xi ;
According to Lemma D.3, the matching induced by this manipulation is in SA. More-
over, since (l′1, . . . , l
′
n) is a satisfiable assignment, from Lemma D.5, for all j ∈ [m],
wrcj is better off and matched with m
l
cj
. Therefore, for all j ∈ [m], mlcj is rejected by
wlcj andm
l
cj
must be matched with wrcj and for all 1 ≤ b ≤ 5, w
b
cj
is matched with her
favorite man.
By Theorem B.1, to obtain a successful deviation, no woman is worse off. There-
fore, for all cj , w
l
cj
, wrcj and w
b
cj
with 1 ≤ b ≤ 5, their partners remain the same, since
they are already matched with their favorite partners.
• If l′i = −xi, either w
+2
xi
is strictly better off to get matched with m−3xi , implying
w−3xi must be matched withm
+1
xi
; or all wxi’s partners remain the same.
• If l′i = +xi, either w
−2
xi
is strictly better off to get matched with m+3xi , implying
w+3xi must be matched withm
−1
xi
; or all wxi’s partners remain the same.
Therefore, without loss of generality, there exists an i with l′i = −xi, If l
′
i = −xi,
w+2xi is strictly better off to get matched with m
−3
xi
. We have all women in Wi =
{w+1xi , w
+2
xi
, w+3xi , w
−1
xi
, w−2xi , w
−3
xi
} have received more than one proposal and they are
matched with one of Mi = {m+1xi ,m
+2
xi
,m+3xi ,m
−1
xi
,m−2xi ,m
−3
xi
}. Moreover, there is
no man m /∈ Mi having made a proposal to some w ∈ Wi. Henceforth, by Theo-
rem 2.1, there is no permutation manipulation that can achieve such matching.
Lemma C.3. φ is satisfiable if there exists a strong or super-strong Nash equilibrium
in G′(φ).
Proof. From Lemma D.3, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, w+2xi and w
−2
xi
cannot manipulate to
be matched with m−3xi and m
+3
xi
respectively. Therefore, we create the assignment as
follows:
1. +xi is assigned true if and only if w
+2
xi
is matched withm−3xi ;
2. otherwise, −xi is assigned true;
Notice that if there exists a j ∈ [m] such thatmlcj is not rejected byw
l
cj
, then according
to the analysis in the example in Section E, there exists a deviation that can make both
w1cj and w
3
cj
strictly better off. Therefore, for all j ∈ [m],mlcj must be rejected by w
l
cj
.
By Lemma C.1, wrcj is better off and according to Lemma D.5. Finally, from Lemma
D.5, since for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m with cj = (s1 xj1 ) ∨ (s
2 xj2 ) ∨ (s
3 xj3), w
r
cj
is better
off, at least one w
sk2
xjk
is matched with m
−sk3
xjk
for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Thus, the assignment
we create must be a satisfiable assignment for φ.
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C.2 Proof of Theorem 5.2
Proof of Theorem 5.2. We first prove that all super-strong Nash equilibrium outcomes
are Pareto-optimal matchings. Assume on the contrary that a matching µ is induced by
a super-strongNash equilibrium but is not Pareto-optimal. Thus there exists a matching
µ′ ∈ SA and µ
′ 6= µ such that µ′(w) w µ(w), ∀w ∈ W and ∃w
′ ∈ W such that
µ′(w′) ≻w′ µ(w′). It follows that µ′(l) = µ(l), ∀l ∈ L because µ is induced by a
super-strong Nash equilibrium, and thus we cannot have µ′(l) ≻l µ(l). Let Rµ and
Rµ′ be the corresponding set of rotations to µ and µ′, respectively. Since µ′(w) w
µ(w), ∀w ∈ W , we have Rµ ⊂ Rµ′ and Rµ′ \ Rµ is a closed set that still can be
eliminated after eliminating Rµ. Let R ∈ Max(Rµ′ \ Rµ). By Lemma A.2, there
exists a manipulator l in R. Thus µ′(l) ≻ µ(l), which contradicts to the fact that
µ′(l′) = µ(l′), ∀l′ ∈ L.
Now we prove that any Pareto-optimal matching can be induced by a super-strong
Nash equilibrium. Assume, for purposes of contradiction, that a matching µ is Pareto-
optimal but cannot be induced by a super-strong Nash equilibrium. Thus any pref-
erence profile that yields matching µ is not a super-strong Nash equilibrium. In par-
ticular, we let the manipulators use the inconspicuous manipulation defined above.
Let P be the true preference profile and P ′ be the inconspicuous preference profile
that would yield matching µ ∈ SA(P ). Since P ′ is not a super-strong Nash equilib-
rium, there exists a subset Ls of L, if jointly misreport another preference profile, can
make the induced matching to be µ′ ∈ SA(P ), such that ∀l ∈ Ls, µ
′(l) Pl µ(l)
and ∃l′ ∈ Ls, µ′(l′) ≻Pl′ µ(l
′). Moreover, there exists w ∈ W \ Ls, such that
µ′(w) ≺Pw µ(w), since otherwise we have µ
′(w) Pw µ(w), ∀w ∈ W , which con-
tradicts to the Pareto-optimality of µ. Notice that, in inconspicuous preference profile
P ′, we have for all w ∈ W ,m ≻P
′
w µ(w) if and only ifm ≻
P
w µ(w) since the order of
men ranked higher than µ(w) in P ′(w) is exactly the same as P (w). Therefore, for all
l ∈ Ls, µ′(l) ≻P
′
l µ(l). However, according to Theorem B.1, since no manipulators
are worse off according to P ′, we have that no women are worse off according to P ′.
Also, for all w ∈W \ Ls, µ
′(w) P
′
l µ(w) implies µ
′(w) Pl µ(w). Thus, µ
′ PW µ.
A contradiction.
D Omitted Proofs in Section 6
D.1 Proof of Theorem 6.1
Clearly, this problem is in NP since given a preference profile, we can apply Gale-
Shapley algorithm to generate the induced matching and verify the solution. In order
to show the NP-completeness, we reduce 3-SAT to this problem. Given an instance
of 3-SAT φ, suppose the variable set is V = {x1, . . . , xn}, the corresponding literal
set is L = {+xi,−xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, and the clause set is {c1, . . . , cm}, where cj =
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(l1j , l
2
j , l
3
j ). We construct an instance of our problemG(φ) with N = 6n+ 2m and
M = {m+1xi ,m
+2
xi
,m+3xi | ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {m
−1
xi
,m−2xi ,m
−3
xi
| ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n}
∪ {mlcj | ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m} ∪ {m
r
cj
| ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m}
W = {w+1xi , w
+2
xi
, w+3xi | ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {w
−1
xi
, w−2xi , w
−3
xi
| ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n}
∪ {wlcj | ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m} ∪ {w
r
cj
| ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m}
The set of manipulators is
L = {w+2xi | ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {w
−2
xi
| ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {wrcj | ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m}
The preference lists of each agent is specified as follows (the “· · · ” part at the end can
be anything). For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and each xi, in the positive side (with superscript+),
P (m+1xi ) = w
+1
xi
≻ w+2xi ≻ w
−3
xi
≻ · · ·
P (m+2xi ) = w
+2
xi
≻ w+1xi ≻ · · ·
P (w+1xi ) = m
+2
xi
≻ m+1xi ≻ · · ·
P (w+2xi ) = m
−3
xi
≻ m+1xi ≻ m
+2
xi
≻ m+3xi ≻ · · ·
P (w+3xi ) = m
−1
xi
≻ m+3xi ≻ · · ·
In the negative side (with superscript−), similarly,
P (m−1xi ) = w
−1
xi
≻ w−2xi ≻ w
+3
xi
≻ · · ·
P (m−2xi ) = w
−2
xi
≻ w−1xi ≻ · · ·
P (w−1xi ) = m
−2
xi
≻ m−1xi ≻ · · ·
P (w−2xi ) = m
+3
xi
≻ m−1xi ≻ m
−2
xi
≻ m−3xi ≻ · · ·
P (w−3xi ) = m
+1
xi
≻ m−3xi ≻ · · ·
Suppose+xi ∈ ckj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ K
+
i . The preference list ofm
+3
xi
is
P (m+3xi ) = w
+2
xi
≻ w+3xi ≻ w
l
ck1
≻ wlck2 ≻ · · · ≻ w
l
ck
K
+
i
≻ w−2xi ≻ · · ·
Similarly, Suppose−xi ∈ ckj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ K
−
i . The preference list ofm
r3
xi
is
P (m−3xi ) = w
−2
xi
≻ w−3xi ≻ w
l
ck1
≻ wlck2 ≻ · · · ≻ w
l
ck
K
−
i
≻ w+2xi ≻ · · ·
Finally, we specify the preference lists for the agent with subscript cj . For all 1 ≤ j ≤
m,
P (mlcj ) = w
l
cj
≻ wrcj ≻ · · ·
P (mrcj ) = w
r
cj
≻ wlcj ≻ · · ·
P (wrcj ) = m
l
cj
≻ mrcj ≻ · · ·
24
Suppose cj = (s
1 xj1 )∨(s
2 xj2 )∨(s
3 xi3). where s
1, s2, s3 ∈ {−,+}. The preference
list of wlcj is
5
P (wlcj ) = m
r
cj
≻ m
s13
xj1
≻ m
s23
xj2
≻ m
s33
xj3
≻ mlcj ≻ · · ·
To complete the reduction, we prove that φ is satisfiable if and only if G(φ) has
a solution, i.e., there exists a strategy profile, whose induced matching is stable and
strictly better off for all manipulators.
First, notice the stable matching µ generated by true preference lists is µ(m+kxi ) =
w+kxi , µ(m
−k
xi
) = w−kxi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ k ≤ 3 and µ(m
l
cj
) = wlcj , µ(m
r
cj
) = wrcj
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Before providing proofs for both directions, we prove following
lemmas first to establish intuitions.
Lemma D.1. For all i ∈ [n], w+2xi can perform a single-agent manipulation to be
matched withm+1xi .
Proof. w+2xi can manipulate her preference list to P (w
+2
xi
) = m−3xi ≻ m
+1
xi
≻ m+3xi ≻
m+2xi ≻ · · · .
Lemma D.2. For all i ∈ [n], w+2xi can perform a single-agent manipulation to be
matched withm−3xi .
Proof. w+2xi can manipulate her preference list to P (w
+2
xi
) = m−3xi ≻ m
+3
xi
≻ m+1xi ≻
m+2xi ≻ · · · .
By symmetry of construction, we have for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, woman w−2xi can
perform a single-agent manipulation to be matched withm−1xi orm
+3
xi
.
Lemma D.3. w+2xi and w
−2
xi
cannot manipulate such that they are matched with m−3xi
andm+3xi respectively at the same time, in any feasible permutationmanipulation, while
it is possible for them to manipulate to be matched withm+1xi andm
−1
xi
,m−3xi andm
−1
xi
,
or,m+1xi andm
+3
xi
, respectively.
Before proving Lemma D.3, we first prove the following lemma,
Lemma D.4. If the induced matching of a permutation manipulation onG(φ) is stable
with respect to true preference lists, then
1. For all i ∈ [n], ms3xi , he cannot make proposals to any woman ranked below
w−s2xi in his true preference list; Moreover, he cannot be matched with any w
l
cj
;
2. For all i ∈ [n], ms1xi and m
s1
xi
with s ∈ {+,−}, he can only make proposals to
woman w
s′k
xi with s
′ ∈ {+,−} and k ∈ {1, 2, 3};
3. For all j ∈ [m], bothmlcj andm
r
cj
, he can only make proposals to wlcj and w
r
cj
;
5If sk = +, then sk
3
= +3; otherwise, if sk = −, sk3 = −3.
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Proof. Denote
Wi = {w
+1
xi
, w+2xi , w
+3
xi
, w−1xi , w
−2
xi
, w−3xi }
and
Mi = {m
+1
xi
,m+2xi ,m
+3
xi
,m−1xi ,m
−2
xi
,m−3xi }.
First, forms3xi with j 6= i, s ∈ {+,−}, since w
−s2
xi
putsms3xj as the favorite candi-
date, ifms3xi proposes to any woman ranked below w
−s2
xi
in his true preference list, the
induced matching is unstable with respect to true preference lists. Moreover, if ms3xi
proposes to some wlcj , then w
l
cj
accepts ms3xj1 and rejects m
l
cj
, next, wrcj accepts m
l
cj
and rejectsmrcj , and finally, w
l
cj
acceptsmrcj and rejectsm
s3
xj1
.
Second, exceptm+3xi andm
−3
xi
, all men inMi only propose to women inWi before
they propose to the woman ranking him as the highest. Therefore, with similar argu-
ments, we conclude that ms1xi and m
s1
xi
with s ∈ {+,−}, he can only make proposals
to woman w
s′k
xi with s
′ ∈ {+,−} and k ∈ {1, 2, 3}
Third, since wlcj ranksm
r
cj
as favorite and wrcj ranksm
l
cj
as favorite, according to
the preference lists ofmlcj andm
r
cj
, we can conclude they can only make proposals to
wlcj and w
r
cj
;
Proof of Lemma D.3. To achieve other combinations, w+2xi and w
−2
xi
can manipulate
their preference lists by following the manipulations in Lemma D.1 and Lemma D.2
according to their target partners.
We prove the remaining case by contradiction. Suppose w+2xi and w
−2
xi
can manip-
ulate to a matching µ such that they are matched withm−3xi andm
+3
xi
. Then, since w+2xi
is matched withm−3xi , the closed set of rotations
({m+1xi ,m
−3
xi
}, {w+2xi , w
−3
xi
}, {w−3xi , w
+2
xi
})
must be eliminated, which contains rotation
({m+2xi ,m
+1
xi
}, {w+2xi , w
+1
xi
}, {w+1xi , w
+2
xi
}).
Similarly, since w−2xi is matched withm
+3
xi
, the closed set of rotations
({m−1xi ,m
+3
xi
}, {w−2xi , w
+3
xi
}, {w+3xi , w
−2
xi
})
must be eliminated, which contains rotation
({m−2xi ,m
−1
xi
}, {w−2xi , w
−1
xi
}, {w−1xi , w
−2
xi
}).
Therefore, all of Wi = {w+1xi , w
+2
xi
, w+3xi , w
−1
xi
, w−2xi , w
−3
xi
} have received more than
one proposal. Moreover, according to Lemma D.4, they are matched with one ofMi =
{m+1xi ,m
+2
xi
,m+3xi ,m
−1
xi
,m−2xi ,m
−3
xi
}.
Henceforth, by Theorem 2.1, µ ∈ SA only if there is some man m /∈ Mi having
made a proposal to some w ∈ Wi in order to create connections from s. However,
according to Lemma D.4, if µ ∈ SA, no other manm /∈Mi can make proposals to any
w ∈ Wi.
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We point out that in this lemma, our construction contains the example in Table ??
as a gadget. According to this lemma, given an outcome of a manipulation, we con-
struct the assignment as follows. +xi is assigned true if and only if w
+2
xi
is matched
with m−3xi ; otherwise, −xi is assigned true. Next lemma guarantees that such assign-
ment is a satisfiable assignment for φ.
Lemma D.5. For all j ∈ [m], suppose cj = (s1 xj1 )∨ (s
2 xj2)∨ (s
3 xj3 ). Then, after
manipulation, woman wrcj can be better off if and only if at least one w
sk2
xjk
is matched
withm
−sk3
xjk
for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Proof. if direction: Without loss of generality, suppose ws2xj1 with s = s
1 is matched
with m−s3xj1 and thus, m
−s3
xj1
has made proposal to w−s2xj1 , w
−s3
xj1
≻ · · · ≻ wlcj ≻ · · · ≻
ws2xj1 ≻ · · · . Thus, w
l
cj
accepts m−s3xj1 and rejects m
l
cj
, next, wrcj accepts m
l
cj
and
rejects mrcj , and finally, w
l
cj
accepts mrcj and rejects m
−s3
xj1
. Therefore, wrcj is better
off. Moreover, if more than one w
sk2
xjk
is matched with m
−sk3
xjk
, it does not change the
matching of wrcj since she is already matched with her favorite one.
only if direction: If no w
sk2
xjk
is matched with m
−sk3
xjk
, notice that no m
−sk3
xjk
makes
proposal to wlcj since from argument in “if direction”, we can see that if m
−sk3
xjk
makes
proposal towlcj , w
sk2
xjk
is matched withm
−sk3
xjk
. Therefore, if wrcj is better off, thenw
r
cj
is
matchedwithmlcj andw
l
cj
is matchedwithmrcj , and notice that,w
l
cj
, wrcj have received
more than one proposals. Henceforth, the matching after manipulation is in SA only if
there is some man outsidemlcj ,m
r
cj
having made proposal to one of wlcj , w
r
cj
in order
to create an edge pointing to the strongly connected component. However, according
to Lemma D.4, we can conclude that no man outside mlcj ,m
r
cj
having made proposal
to one of wlcj , w
r
cj
.
With Lemma D.1, Lemma D.2, Lemma D.3 and Lemma D.5, we are ready to com-
plete our reduction by showing φ is satisfiable if and only if G(φ) has a solution.
Lemma D.6. φ is satisfiable only if G(φ) has a solution.
Proof. Suppose (l′1, . . . , l
′
n) is a satisfiable assignment. For all i ∈ [n],
1. if l′i = +xi: w
+2
xi
manipulates tom−3xi and w
−2
xi
manipulates tom−1xi ;
2. if l′i = −xi: w
+2
xi
manipulates tom+1xi and w
−2
xi
manipulates tom+3xi ;
According to Lemma D.3, the matching induced by this manipulation is in SA. More-
over, since (l′1, . . . , l
′
n) is a satisfiable assignment, from Lemma D.5, for all j ∈ [m],
wrcj is better off.
Lemma D.7. φ is satisfiable if G(φ) has a solution.
Proof. From Lemma D.3, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, w+2xi and w
−2
xi
cannot manipulate to
be matched with m−3xi and m
+3
xi
respectively. Therefore, we create the assignment as
follows:
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1. +xi is assigned true if and only if w
+2
xi
is matched withm−3xi ;
2. otherwise, −xi is assigned true;
Moreover, from Lemma D.5, since for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m with cj = (s1 xj1) ∨ (s
2 xj2 ) ∨
(s3 xj3), w
r
cj
is better off, at least one w
sk2
xjk
is matched with m
−sk3
xjk
for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Thus, the assignment we create must be a satisfiable assignment for φ.
D.2 Proof of Theorem 6.2
Proof. First of all, it is easy to check whether a matching is strictly better off and
by using Algorithm 1, we can efficiently check whether a matching is Pareto-optimal.
Therefore, this problem is in #P.
Since computing the number of satisfiable assignment for 3-SAT problem is #P-
complete, we only need to show that our reduction is parsimonious, i.e., the numbers
of solutions in each problem are the same.
First, we show that given one satisfiable assignment for 3-SAT problem, we can
construct a solution in PARETO-BETTER. According to Lemma D.6, we can con-
struct a solution that makes all manipulators better off. Thus, it is sufficient to show
that the constructed solution is also Pareto-optimal. In fact, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, either
w+2xi or w
+2
xi
is matched with her favorite partner, but it is impossible for them to be
matched with their favorite partners simultaneously. Moreover, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m, wrcj
is matched with her favorite partner. Thus, such a solution must be Pareto-optimal.
Second, we show that given a solution to PARETO-BETTER, we can construct
a satisfiable assignment for 3-SAT problem. From Lemma D.7, we have shown that
given a matching that makes all manipulators better off, we can construct a satisfi-
able assignment. Thus, given a solution to PARETO-BETTER, we are also able to
construct a satisfiable assignment for 3-SAT problem.
E Non-existence of a strong Nash equilibrium
The following example (see Table 2) demonstrates that a strong Nash equilibrium does
not always exist, neither does super-strong Nash equilibrium.
m1 w1 w5 w2 w3 w4
m2 w1 w2 w3 w5 w4
m3 w3 w1 w2 w4 w5
m4 w3 w4 w1 w2 w5
m5 w5 w1 w4 w2 w3
(a) Men’s preference lists
w1 m3 m5 m1 m2 m4
w2 m5 m3 m1 m2 m4
w3 m1 m3 m4 m2 m5
w4 m4 m1 m2 m3 m5
w5 m2 m5 m1 m3 m4
(b) Women’s preference lists
Table 2: Example of permutation manipulation to unstable matching
The stable matching outputted by the Gale-Shapley algorithm is
{(m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3), (m4, w4), (m5, w5)},
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while only w1 and w3 receives more than one proposals in the entire process. Let the
manipulators be w1 and w3.
First, we argue that the stable matching mentioned before is the only possible out-
come of Nash equilibrium. So this matching is the only possible outcome of a strong
Nash equilibrium.
At the first round, m1 and m2 propose to w1, m3 and m4 propose to w3, and m5
proposes to w5. If w3 manipulates, the first step he can do is to reject m3 and keep
m4. Thenm3 proposes to w1. Sincem3 is w1’s favorite partner, w1 can only keepm3
and reject m1 and m2 to get a stable matching w.r.t true preferences. After that, m2
proposes to w2 and m1 proposes to w5, gets rejected, and then proposes to w2. Now,
w2 rejectsm2 to keepm1 andm2 proposes to w3 in the next round. Notice that if w3
rejectsw4 and keepsm2, then every woman has exactly one proposal and the algorithm
terminates, resulting w3 matches tom2, worse thanm3. Therefore,m3 can only reject
w2 and keep w4. After that, w2 proposes to w5, w5 rejectsm5 andm5 proposes to w1.
Again, w1 can only rejectm5 to obtain a stable matching, and thus,m5 proposes to w4
and the algorithm terminates, resulting w3 matches to m4, worse thanm3. Therefore,
w3 cannot manipulate at the first round. The only remaining way to manipulate is to let
w1 manipulate in the first round, to keepm2 and rejectm1. Then,m1 proposes to w5,
gets rejected, proposes to w2. Now, onlyw3 has two proposals fromm3 andm4. Since
w3 cannot manipulate, she can only keepm3 and reject w4, after which, the algorithm
terminates, resulting w1 matches tom2, worse thanm1.
Next, we show that w1 and w3 can manipulate this outcome jointly so that both of
them are better off. Consider that w3 changes her preference list tom1 ≻ m4 ≻ m3 ≻
m2 ≻ m5 and w1 changes her preference list to m5 ≻ m1 ≻ m2 ≻ m3 ≻ m4. Then,
the matching outputted by the Gale-Shapley algorithm is
{(m1, w3), (m2, w5), (m3, w2), (m4, w4), (m5, w1)},
in which both w1 and w3 are better off.
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